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mAbstract: We conduct a large-scale field experiment to investigate how Chinese
firms respond to Internet job board applications from ethnic minority and Han
applicants. We signal ethnicity by using names that are typically Han Chinese and
distinctively Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uighur. We find significant differences in
callback rates by ethnicity. These differences vary systematically across ethnic groups.
Not all firms discriminate—approximately half treat all candidates equally.
State-owned firms are much less likely than others to discriminate in favor of Han
candidates and both state- and foreign-owned firms are significantly more likely to
treat candidates equally than do privately owned firms.
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Introduction and context
Laborers shall not be discriminated against in employment due to their nationality,
race, sex, or religious belief.
Article 12: People’s Republic of China Labor Law (2012)
Workers enjoy the right to employment on equal footing and to choice of jobs on
their own initiative in accordance with law. In seeking employment, workers shall
not be subject to discrimination because of their ethnic backgrounds, race, gender,
religious beliefs, etc.
Article 3: People's Republic of China Law on Promotion of Employment (2012)
There is a nascent but growing academic literature focused on how China’s ethnic mi-
norities have fared in China’s economic transition. Researchers have addressed dispar-
ities in rural and urban income (Gustafsson & Li 2003) (Ding & Li 2009), rural poverty
(Gustafsson & Ding 2008), occupational attainment and job segregation (Hannum &
Xie 1998), job search, hiring, and promotion (Hasmath 2011, 2012b; Howell and Fan
2011), and labor force participation (Maurer-Fazio, Hughes, & Zhang 2007, 2010). Al-
though the specific research questions asked, and methodologies applied, have varied
considerably, most of the above papers find that China’s ethnic minorities have not
fared well in comparison to the majority Han during China’s transition to a market
economy. However, some of the differences in Han and minority wellbeing are2012 Maurer-Fazio; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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important to sort out whether and to what extent observed differences in the labor mar-
ket outcomes of majority Han and ethnic minority participants are due to differences in
Han and ethnic minority attributes (differences in productive characteristics) or to the
treatment of those attributes, that is, to discrimination. A number of the above men-
tioned studies apply decomposition techniques to try to discover what share of the dif-
ferences in labor market outcomes can be “explained” by differences in productive
characteristics. The “unexplained” differences, that is, the residual differences in income
or labor force participation or occupational attainment are then often attributed to dis-
crimination but may in reality be due to model misspecification, omitted variables, and/
or unobservable aspects of productivity differences.
This study takes a more direct approach to studying discrimination. Using a resume
audit approach we directly measure the extent of ethnic discrimination in the hiring
practices of Chinese firms. The resume audit methodology allows us to strictly control
aspects of job candidates’ productivity experimentally while varying their ethnicity (as
denoted by ethnically differentiated names)1. Resume audit studies have been used to
study discrimination in a wide variety of country and labor market contexts2. This,
however, is the first application of a resume audit study to test for discrimination
against ethnic minorities in the hiring practices of Chinese firms.
In our resume audit study, conducted in the summer of 2011, we submitted 21,592
applications to 10,796 positions advertised on Internet job boards in 6 Chinese cities.
The positions varied over three types of occupations. We randomly paired Han applica-
tions with one of three minorities with ethnically distinct names: Mongolian, Uighur,
and Tibetan. We found significant discrimination against each of the minorities except
in Hohhot and Urumqi-- two autonomous minority areas. Discrimination was less
prevalent in tight labor markets. Although candidates of each minority group experi-
enced discrimination, not all firms discriminated. Close to half the firms treated their
paired applicants equally. State-owned firms were significantly more likely to treat can-
didates equally and much less likely to discriminate in favor of Han candidates than
private firms.
In the following sections of this paper, we first provide some context on China’s eth-
nic minorities and then review the literature that examines how they have fared during
China’s economic transformation to a market economy. We then briefly review the lit-
erature on ethnicity-focused resume audit studies and go on to describe our own
experimental design. We then present the analysis of our results—first from the per-
spective of individual applicants and then from the perspective of the firms selecting
applicants for callbacks. We summarize our findings in the concluding section.
China’s ethnic minorities
According to China’s 2010 population census, ethnic minorities constitute 8.4% of the
Chinese population (112 million people). We use the term ethnic minority here to refer to
members of the 55 minority groups who, along with the Han majority, make up the coun-
try’s 56 officially recognized ethnic groups. Many of China’s ethnic minority people (75%)
dwell in regions that are specially designated as autonomous ethnic minority areas (Informa-
tion Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1999: 15). However, the
Han also comprise a significant proportion of these regions’ populations3. These officially
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in natural resources and for the most part located in the politically sensitive border regions
of southwest and northwest China (SEAC. State Ethnic Affairs Committee 2003). Given that
official economic data on China’s minority peoples is usually published by autonomous re-
gion rather than by ethnic group4, it is quite difficult to get a sense of the relative economic
well being of China’s minority peoples. Even though overall economic indicators show a ris-
ing standard of living in ethnic minority regions (Mackerras 2003: 56–76), these improve-
ments have not kept pace with developments in the national economy. Sautman (2010)
reports that the material gap between Han and minority areas continues to widen.
According to a recent government White Paper:
The Constitution stipulates, "The state does its utmost to promote the common
prosperity of all ethnic groups in the country." The Law on Regional Ethnic
Autonomy stipulates that it is a legal obligation of the higher-level state organs to
help the minority areas accelerate their development. (Information Office of the
State Council of the People's Republic of China 2009).
With its implementation of the Western Development Plan in 2000, the Chinese state
began to address the economic development of minority areas in earnest5. The Plan inte-
grated investment in large-scale development and infrastructure projects in western China
with preferential allocation of resources to autonomous minority areas (Information Office of
the State Council 2009). This development strategy rapidly accelerated GDP growth in
China’s western minority regions. It also led to increased ethnic tensions in particular areas
(Bhattacharji 2012). For example, Xinjiang’s economy has grown at double-digit rates. The
rising number of jobs has led to substantial in-migration of Han to the area. This has caused
Uighur residents to fear they are being excluded from the good jobs and to believe that the
Han migrants are grabbing these jobs as well as other resources (The Economist 2011), which
in turn has led to a rising ethno-religious consciousness (Hasmath 2012a, 2012b). There are
reports of rising resentment over job discrimination (Bequelin 2009, Fallows 2009)6.
According to Sautman (2010), there are two main types of preferential policies aimed
at China’s ethnic minorities: subsidies to minority areas and affirmative action for mi-
nority people. The extent of the latter varies by particular minority. The government’s
preferential policies include preferential treatment in school admissions, hiring and
promotion. Sautman (2010) points out that the preferential policies were designed at a
time when the state sector was the dominant sector in the Chinese economy and that
few of these policies apply to the private sector, which has grown in importance rapidly
throughout the reform period. Whether, and to what extent, these policies are imple-
mented are important questions, as is the question of whether the policies are differen-
tially applied in state-sector and privately owned firms.
While ethnic minorities in western China resent the in-migration of substantial num-
bers of Han, there is also rising Han resentment of minorities who are viewed as receiv-
ing unwarranted advantages (Sautman 2010). This long-smoldering resentment, burst
into flame after protests in Lhasa in 2008 and Urumqi in 2009 turned into violent riots
that resulted in many casualties and fatalities.
Although there are competing claims of unfair/unwarranted labor market advantages
and disadvantages being made by some Han and some minority job seekers, others feel
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of university graduates of the Inner Mongolia Industrial University found that most
respondents believed employers cared much more about candidates’ abilities than their
ethnicity. Of those who responded that they believed that employers cared about ethnic
minority status, some felt minority language skills were valued and advantageous in
searching for jobs and others felt that particular work units/employers discriminated
against minorities.
In this paper we directly investigate how minorities are treated relative to the Han in
a rapidly expanding segment of China’s urban labor markets—Internet job boards. We
focus on just one aspect of labor market experience—whether, and to what extent,
firms take ethnicity into account in making their hiring decisions. More specifically, we
focus on whether firms discriminate on the basis ethnicity when making decisions
about which applicants to interview—a critical first step in the hiring process.
Literature review—ethnic minorities in China’s economic reform
There is a growing interest in understanding how China’s economic transition of the
last three decades has affected ethnic minority people. Gustafsson and Li (2003) find
that the gaps in rural income between the Han and ethnic minorities widened from
19.2% to 35.9% between 1988 and 1995 (based on survey data from 19 provinces). They
decompose the income differentials and attribute the lion’s share to differences in
endowments—particularly to location, given that China’s minorities are clustered in
provinces with low per capita GDP. Gustaffson and Ding (2008) build on this earlier
work to focus on poverty. Based on a 2002 survey of 22 provinces, they argue that pov-
erty in rural China has a very strong spatial dimension—that ethnic minorities have
higher rates of both persistent and temporary poverty because minorities are concen-
trated in western China, home to most of China’s poor. They report that that ethnic
minority status has little independent effect in explaining poverty and, rather, that fac-
tors such as the education level of the household head, village mean income, and
whether the village is located in a mountainous area are much more important factors
than ethnicity. Hannum and Xie (1998) employ population census data to examine the
effects of market reform on differences in occupational attainment of Xinjiang’s (mainly
Turkic) minorities in comparison to the Han. They find that the ethnic gap in occupa-
tional attainment between the Han and the minorities widened between the 1982 and
1990 censuses. They also conclude that the gap is not directly attributable to discrimin-
ation but rather to growing differences in productive characteristics, in particular, to an
increased gap in the educational attainment between the Han and the minorities and a
presumed strengthening of the relationship between educational attainment and
higher-status occupations.
In contrast to the above-mentioned studies, when Ding and Li (2009) analyze differ-
ences in income determination for Hui (minority) and Han urban residents in Ningxia
based on survey data gathered in 2007 and decompose the differences in earnings into
treatment and endowment effects, they find that the treatment effects are more import-
ant than endowment effects in explaining the incomes differences. They point out,
however, that the treatment effects do not always favor the Han. In their study, the
returns to education are somewhat higher for the Han than the Hui, while the returns
to experience are higher for the Hui than the Han. They find that state ownership of
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norities were affected more adversely than the Han by reductions in urban sector em-
ployment and exited the labor force more rapidly than Han. Maurer-Fazio, Hughes,
and Zhang (2010) estimate urban labor force participation rates of women. They focus
on the experience of six ethnic minorities and the Han and find sizable differences. In
pair-wise comparisons between Han and ethnic women, they find that the treatment of
women’s characteristics, whether in the market or socially, tends to increase the Han
advantage in labor force participation, while the levels of those characteristics tend to
reduce the Han advantage. After conducting interviews and analyzing census data,
Hasmath (2011) argues that in practice ethnic minorities are disadvantaged relative to
the Han in terms of hiring and promotions, particularly for well-paying, high-skill jobs.
The economic literature to date suggests that China’s ethnic minorities are not faring
particularly well, relative to the Han, in terms of labor market outcomes. However,
there is no clear consensus as to whether the differences in income, poverty, occupa-
tional attainment, and related factors are due to differences in residential location and
productive characteristics or to discriminatory treatment.
Review of the literature—ethnicity-focused resume audit studies
The resume audit methodology is well suited for measuring discrimination in hiring.7
Resume audit studies combine the advantages of controlled experiments and realistic
field settings. In a resume audit study, sets of resumes are created for fictitious appli-
cants. They are carefully crafted to ensure that candidates will appear, on paper, to be
equally productive with similar work and educational histories. The researchers then
control a particular attribute under study such as gender or age (or, in our case, ethni-
city). Discrimination is measured by the differences in the rates of callbacks for inter-
views received by individuals whose applications typically vary only in terms of the
attribute under study.
Resume audit studies have been used to investigate the role of ethnicity in a number
of different national settings. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) study race in US labor
markets by randomly assigning White-sounding and African American-sounding
names to resumes and submitting those resumes to positions advertised in Boston and
Chicago newspapers. They find that candidates with White names receive 50% more
callbacks than candidates with African American names. Siddique (2008) explores
caste-based discrimination in India’s white-collar labor market. She finds that low-caste
applicants (signaled by typical low-caste names) need to put in 20% more applications
than high-cast applicants to get the same number of callbacks for interviews. She finds
that high-caste applicants received even higher callback rates when the recruiting is
carried out by men or by Hindu recruiters. Kaas and Manger (2011) develop a study of
German firms’ responses to applications for student internships from applicants with
Turkish- and German-sounding names. They are particularly careful to create resumes
that do not conflate immigration status with ethnicity. The applicants they create with
Turkish-sounding names “are” German citizens who were both born and educated in
Germany and whose mother tongue is German. The only difference between these
applicants and the others lies in the ethnicity of their names. They find, all else equal,
that the applicants with German sounding names get 14% more callbacks than those
with Turkish-sounding names, in general, but 24% more callbacks from small firms.
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of reference that contain favorable information about the personality of the applicant.
They take this to indicate that the discrimination is statistical in nature, since supplying
more information could eliminate it.
Carlsson and Rooth (2007), Bursell (2007), and Carlsson (2010) conduct resume audit
studies in Sweden using names that sounded Swedish and African or Arab or Middle
Eastern. Booth, Leigh, and Varganova (2011); and Oreopoulos and Dechief (2011) con-
duct resume audit studies in Australia and Canada using names that sounded in the
first case: Anglo-Saxon and Indigenous, Chinese, and Middle Eastern; and in the second
case: English, Indian, or Chinese. Each of these studies finds significant discrimination
against those with foreign-sounding names. The Bursell, Carlsson, and Oreopoulos
and Dechief studies control for differences in language abilities and/or country of
education. Booth, Leigh, and Varganova signal assimilation into Australian society by
giving each of their applicants an Australian high school education. Each of these five
studies incorporates a range of occupations and attempts to use differential callback
rates by occupation to either help sort out or speculate about the sources and types
of discrimination.
We have carefully searched the English and Chinese literature and have not found
any reports of resume audit studies focused on China’s labor markets. However, Guang
and Kong (2010) carried out an audit study of gender and rural status discrimination in
Beijing’s labor market in the summer of 2004. They trained student actors to apply in
person for advertised positions at local Beijing job fairs. Their male and female appli-
cants were assigned roles as either Beijing residents or applicants from outside Beijing
with rural household registrations. These applicants audited 81 employers and found
that rural and female applicants were much more likely to receive negative responses
from recruiters than male and urban applicants. We believe that our study is the first
resume audit study to focus on potential ethnic discrimination in China’s contemporary
labor markets.
Experiment design
This experiment focuses on one very dynamic segment of China’s labor market—the
Internet job board sector. We employ the largest of the Chinese job boards, 51job.com,
to investigate whether Chinese firms respond differently to job applications from ethnic
minority and Han applicants. We denote ethnicity by using applicant names for ethnic
minority job candidates that are recognizably different from those of the Han majority
but typical of Mongolian, Uighur, and Tibetan individuals, respectively.
On a daily basis, millions of jobs are advertised on China’s Internet job boards and
many millions of applications are submitted in response. Some of these job boards are
nationally recognized, while others focus on jobs in a particular region or city or on
jobs of a particular type. Table 1 presents data on the number of page views for the
three most popular job boards in China as of spring 2011.
Our experiment was large in scale—in the summer of 2011, we submitted 21,592 on-
line applications for 10,796 advertised positions. We applied for positions in three
different occupations: accountants, administrative assistants/specialists, and sales repre-
sentatives. These occupations were chosen, in part, because they differ quite extensively
in the degree to which their incumbents typically interact with firms’ customers. The







Daily Page Views Estimate (PV) Yesterday 25,200,000 3,760,000 20,641,600
Week’s mean 37,356,000 5,350,400 26,740,000
Month’s mean 36,076,480 5,396,352 24,420,000
Three-Month’s mean 34,268,256 5,007,744 23,070,536
Mean Daily IP Visitor Volume Estimate*(IP) Yesterday 2,224,000 616,000 1,520,000
Week’s mean 2,248,000 624,000 1,528,000
Month’s mean 2,256,000 614,400 1,504,000
Three-Month’s mean 2,293,600 604,800 1,519,200
Mean Page Count Viewed per Visitor 15 9 19
Source: cn.alexa.com. The Alexa website provides detailed information on, and rankings of, page views for a variety of
Chinese websites.
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sponse to perceived customer preferences. They were also chosen for a very practical
reason—there were thousands of job postings for each of these occupations.
We submitted applications in response to job ads posted for six cities that vary in
terms of the size of their populations, geographic locations, prosperity, and ethnic com-
position. Nanjing (population 6.9 million), is a historically prominent and prosperous
eastern seaboard city located in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. It is the com-
mercial, industrial, and political/administrative capital of Jiangsu Province. Shenzhen
(population 10.4 million) is similarly located in a prosperous coastal region, but in the
southern province of Guangdong on the Pearl River Delta. Shenzhen, a quiet backwater
prior to its 1979 development as a special economic zone, has experienced extremely
rapid growth and the in-migration of many millions of residents from many parts
China. Chengdu and Kunming were chosen for this study due to their location in less
prosperous western provinces. Chengdu (population 7.1 million), located in the heart
of an agricultural, densely populated, interior province, Sichuan, is considered a local
center of commerce and finance and transportation and communication and is an im-
portant part of China’s 2000 Western Development Plan. Kunming (population 3.2 mil-
lion), capital of southwestern China’s Yunnan Province, was chosen because of its
moderate size and because Yunnan is home to 25 of China’s 55 officially recognized
ethnic minorities. It is much more likely that employers and human resource profes-
sionals in Kunming have exposure to individuals of non-Han ethnicity than employers
and human resource professionals in, say, Nanjing. Urumqi (population 2.3 million)
and Hohhot (population 2.0 million) were included in this project because they are
located in regions designated as autonomous minority areas. Urumqi, the capital of the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in northwest China, is an industrial and commer-
cial center. Similarly, Hohhot is the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Re-
gion. It is not only an administrative center but also a cultural and commercial center.
Even though both Urumqi and Hohhot are capitals of ethnic minority areas, the dom-
inant ethnic group, in terms of population share, in each of these areas is Han.
To focus on ethnicity, we limited the range and scope of the resumes we created. Each of
our resumes represented a 24-year old, single, currently employed, university-educated
woman. Each resume was designed to be realistic in terms of job experience, education,
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resumes was based on observation of a very large number of resumes for the same types of
occupations at the same levels of experience that were posted on a competing Internet job
board, chinahr.com. The descriptions of tasks carried out by an applicant on her first
and/or second job after college graduation were taken from these real resumes and ap-
propriately edited and reassigned to our fictional resumes. The company names asso-
ciated with our applicants’ work history were altered to represent real companies
operating in each of our target cities. After the resumes were built, they were randomly
assigned a Han, Mongolian, Uighur, or Tibetan name8. Each resume was assigned an
email address, mobile phone number, ID number, and regular home address.
Four versions of each person’s resume were created that varied along two dimensions.
In two of the four, the candidate had only one job/one employer since college gradu-
ation, and in the other two versions the candidate had already worked for two different
companies. The variation in work history allows us to examine whether employers pre-
fer candidates whose resumes seem to demonstrate stability (just one previous job) to
those who might seem more ambitious/driven (those with two previous jobs and a his-
tory of increasing job responsibilities). For each of these two types of work history (one
or two jobs), we created two types of educational experience—one in which the candi-
date was educated at a local university and one in which the candidate was educated at
a similarly ranked university in another province. We wanted to eliminate, or at least
mitigate, potential employer concern about language issues and/or minority language
education, and thus ensured that each of our job candidate’s university education
took place either in the same city where the job was posted9 or in a province not
known as, nor thought of, an ethnic minority area/minority autonomous region. We
paid close attention to university rankings to ensure that each fictitious candidate
within an occupational category had an education that would be viewed by employ-
ers to be of comparable quality. We attempted to create sets of resumes that were
equivalent in terms of the applicants’ productive characteristics. The registration
process for the 51job.com job board allowed us to upload the four different versions
of each fictitious person’s resume under one name with one email address and one
mobile phone contact number.
Given China’s hukou (residential registration) system, which limits where people may
live and work, we worried that employers might be concerned about whether appli-
cants with ethnic minority names had the right to live and work in the areas for which
the jobs were posted. That is, we feared that a firm might pass over an application from
a minority candidate based on presumptions about her hukou status if the resume
failed to indicate that the applicant was very likely to be a local resident or had in some
way already overcome any potential hukou limitations. To mitigate this concern, we
designed our applicants’ resumes such that each of the applicants already had several
years of work history in the same city as that of the company’s job posting. In half of
our cases, the applicants had, additionally, attended a local university.
Application process
For a two-month period from mid-June to mid-August, we submitted a pair of applica-
tions for each suitable job posting in each of our three occupations in each of our six
locations. By “suitable,” we simply mean that our candidates’ characteristics were a
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positions. For the cities of Chengdu, Kunming, Nanjing, and Shenzhen, we submitted
one Han and one randomly chosen minority for each advertised position. Once the eth-
nic composition of the pair of applications was determined, we randomly chose one of
the four versions of a candidates resume for submission for each applicant. The two
resumes were submitted on the same day, usually within an hour or so of each other.
For the city of Urumqi, we submitted one Han and one Uighur application and simi-
larly for the city of Hohhot, we submitted one Han and one Mongolian application.
The order of submission was randomly determined and tracked. Resume versions were
also carefully tracked. As mentioned above, we submitted close to 22,000 applications
over the course of the summer. However, Internet job boards were not as widely used
in Urumqi and Hohhot as in our other cities--few jobs ads fitting our candidates’ cri-
teria were posted in these locations. We were therefore limited to submitting approxi-
mately 800 applications for the roughly 400 job postings in the two ethnic minority
autonomous regions of our study.
We also collected as much information about the firm advertising each position as
seemed feasible, given the scale of our experiment. We recorded each firm’s name and,
if available, the size of the firm (measured in terms of the number of its employees),
and the type of firm ownership. The vast majority of firms that pursued/contacted our
candidates did so by calling the mobile phones associated with each of our fictitious
candidates. A very small number responded by email and an even smaller number
responded by means of sending a text message to one of the mobile phones. We regis-
tered and recorded as a callback any action by a firm that indicated they were inter-
ested in the candidate and wanted to follow up with an interview or further contact of
one sort or another. The student research assistants answering the calls were trained to
immediately inform callers that the candidate had just accepted another position and
was no longer interested in that firm’s job opening. They responded in like manner to
emails and followed up appropriately, usually with a phone call, to text messages.
Analysis of results from the perspective of individual applicants
There are large and statistically significant differences in the rates of interview callbacks
received by applicants with Han-, Mongolian-, Uighur-, and Tibetan-sounding names.10
1,389 of our 21,592 candidates received callbacks, yielding a callback rate of 6.43%. That is,
on average our candidates were contacted to set up interviews (or to carry out the next
step(s) in the hiring process) by six or seven firms for each hundred applications that they
submitted. The callback rates varied by candidate ethnicity from a high of 8.15% for those
with typical Han names to a low of 3.69% for those with typical Tibetan names.
The bottom row of Table 2 expresses the callback rates of those with Han-sounding
names as a ratio relative to those with minority-sounding names. What these ratios re-
veal is that an equally qualified woman with a Mongolian-sounding name would need
to put in 36% more applications than a woman with a Han-sounding name to get the
same number of callbacks. Women with Uighur- and Tibetan-sounding names would
need to put in 83% and 121% more applications, respectively, than women with Han-
sounding names in order to get the same number of callbacks for interviews. There
appears to be a significant degree of discrimination (on the part of firms that partici-
pate in the Internet job board labor market) against women with ethnic minority names
Table 2 Summary of applicant interview callback rates by ethnicity
Ethnicity Han Mongolian Uighur Tibetan Total
No. of Applications 10,796 3,594 3,548 3,654 21,592
No. of Call Backs 880 216 158 135 1389
Call Back Rate (%) 8.15 6.01 4.45 3.69 6.43
Call Back Ratio (Han/Minority) 1.36 1.83 2.21
Note: The differences between the callback rates received by Han and Minority candidates are significant at the 1% level
in each case.
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sume audit methodology can only detect discrimination in one stage of the hiring
process, but this early stage is the critical one of reviewing resumes in order to choose
candidates for interviews.
The data in Table 3, indicate how the callback rates vary by ethnicity (as indicated by
ethnically-differentiated names) across occupations. As discussed above, we expect that
occupation may come into play as an explanatory variable in a couple of different ways.
First, firms may treat candidates with ethnically-differentiated names differently if they
believe their own customers have discriminatory preferences. If profit-maximizing firms
try to accommodate their customers’ (discriminatory) tastes, we’d expect that minority
candidates in occupations that have more exposure/more interactions with the firms’
customers are more discriminated against than those in occupations with low degrees
of direct interaction with firms’ customers. We expect that sales representatives are
likely to interact more with firms’ customers than administrative assistant/specialists
and, in turn, that administrative assistant/specialists are likely to interact more with a
firms’ customers than accountants. Thus, we might expect the callbacks ratios for those
applying for positions as sales representatives to vary more by ethnicity than those ap-
plying for accounting positions.
Second, it might be the case that the degree of slack or tightness in labor markets var-
ies by occupation and that this will also affect the differences in callback rates (as oposed
to callback ratios) by ethnicity across occupations. In tight labor markets firms could
not as easily indulge either their own or their customers’ discriminatory preferences
(Bursell 2007). We can get a feel for the tightness of the labor markets by the overall
callback rates by occupation.
Table 3 reveals several interesting patterns. (We first note that the number of applications
per occupation was quite similar. The number of applications varied from a low of 7,030
for accounting positions to a high of 7,506 for sales representatives.) Here as in Table 2,Table 3 Applicant interview callback rates (%) and ratios by occupation and ethnicity
Ethnicity Han Mongolian Uighur Tibetan Total
Accounting: 5.86 3.36 2.92 2.77 4.44
Call back Ratio (Han/Minority) 1.74 2.01 2.12
Admin. Assistants: 9.81 9.68 6.82 4.29 8.35
Call back Ratio (Han/Minority) 1.01 1.44 2.29
Sales Representatives: 8.74 5.14 3.64 4.03 6.50
Call back Ratio (Han/Minority) 1.70 2.40 2.17
Note: The differences between the callback rates received by Han and Minority candidates are significant at the 1% level
in each case for each occupation with one exception-- that between Han and Mongolian applicants for administrative
assistant/specialists positions.
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tern: women with Han-sounding names receive a higher rate of callbacks for interviews
than do those with Mongolian-sounding names. Those with Mongolian-sounding names
receive a higher rate of callbacks than those with Uighur-sounding names. And, those with
Uigur-sounding names receive a higher rate of callback rates than those with Tibetan
names. This pattern holds across each of our three occupations.
When we compare the ratio of Han/Minority callbacks for just accounting and sales
representative positions, the two types of positions with the greatest difference in the
degree of direct customer interaction, we observe very little difference in the ratios: the
Han/Mongolian callback ratio for accounting is 1.74 while that for sales representatives
is 1.70. Similarly, the Han/Uighur callback ratios for accounting and sales representa-
tives are 2.01 and 2.40, respectively. The Han/Tibetan ratios for these two types of
positions are 2.12 and 2.17, respectively.
When we rank these occupations by the “tightness” of the labor market as evidenced
by the overall callback rate, it appears that the market is tightest for administrative as-
sistant/specialists. The overall callback rate for this occupation is 8.35%. The overall
callback rates for sales representatives and accountants are 6.50% and 4.44%, respect-
ively. It is in this relatively tight market for administrative assistant/specialists that we
observe significantly lower callback ratios for Han/Mongolian and Han/Uighur ratios,
that is, in this relatively tight market, Uighur and Mongolian candidates are treated in a
fashion that is more akin to how Han are treated than was the case in the markets with
more slack. This lends some support to the notion that the discrimination is taste
based. It is more difficult for employers to indulge a taste for discrimination in a tight
labor market.
As noted above, the cities chosen for this project vary considerably in terms of their
geographic location, prosperity, and ethnic composition. Urumqi and Hohhot are polit-
ical/administrative capitals of minority automous regions that have provincial-level sta-
tus. According to the 2000 Population Census of China, while the Xinjiang Uighur
Automous Regions’s officially designated ethnic minority populations constitute 59% of
its population, the population of its capital, Urumqi, is 75% Han. Similarly, the popula-
tion of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region is predominantly Han, that is only
21% of its population is classified as minority, and the population of its capital, Hohhot,
is only 13% minority. It seems that both differences in the ethnic composition of the
cities in our study plus differences in local cultural norms could lead to differences in
the treatment of ethnic minorities in the labor market by location. Callback rates and
ratios by city are presented in Table 4, below.
In Chengdu, Kunming, Nanjing, and Shenzhen, our application procedure dictated
that for each opening we submit pairs of applicants that consisted of one Han applicant
and one randomly chosen applicant from those with Mongolian, Uighur, and Tibetan
names. In Hohhot and Urumqi, we paired a Han applicant with an applicant of the
dominant minority of each region. That is, in Urumqi we paired Han and Uighur appli-
cants and in Hohhot we paired Han and Mongolian applicants.
Reading across the rows of Table 4 reveals that in both Chengdu and Shenzhen, each
of our minorities (Mongolian, Uighur, and Tibetan) experienced callback rates that
were significantly lower than those experienced by candidates with Han-sounding
names. In Kunming, the callback rate for those with Mongolian-sounding names was
Table 4 Applicant interview callback rates (%) by city and ethnicity
City Han Mongolian Uighur Tibetan All Applicants
Chengdu: Callback % 9.66 5.14* 3.98* 3.24* 6.84
Ratio (Han/Minority) 1.88 2.45 3.01
No. of Apps for Chengdu 3,105 914 955 1,236 6,210
Kunming: Callback % 9.40 11.08 6.72* 4.35 8.29
Ratio (Han/Minority) 0.84 1.38 2.18
No. of Apps for Kunming 2,148 659 685 804 4,296
Nanjing: Callback % 6.47 5.88 5.10 4.23* 5.78
Ratio (Han/Minority) 1.10 1.27 1.53
No. of Apps for Nanjing 2,119 748 686 685 4,238
Shenzhen: Callback % 7.19 3.17* 3.05* 3.34* 5.18
Ratio (Han/Minority) 2.27 2.36 2.15
No. of Apps for Shenzhen 3,019 1,074 1,016 929 6,038
Hohhot: Callback % 9.55 9.05 N/A N/A 9.30
Ratio (Han/Mongolian) 1.06
No. of Apps for Hohhot 199 199 398
Urumqi: Callback % 2.43 N/A 3.88 N/A 3.16
Ratio (Han/Uighur) 0.63
No. of Apps for Urumqi 206 206 412
Notes: * Indicates difference in callback rates between Han and minority is significant at the 5% level.
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Tibetans had callback rates significantly lower that those with Han names.
Reading down the columns of Table 4 reveals that the only minority that experienced
significantly lower rates of callbacks than Han in each of the four main cities were the
Tibetans. The Uighurs had lower callback rates in three of the main cities, that is, in all
locations except Kunming. The Mongolians experienced callback rates that were similar
to that of the Han in Kunming and Nanjing and significantly lower callback rates in
Chengdu and Shenzhen.
Turning now to the two cities in minority areas, in Hohhot, candidates with Mongolian
names seemed to receive callbacks at rates very similar to those with Han names. This
could be simply that minorities face much less discrimination or even receive favorable
treatment in regions designated as autonomous minority regions. However, it was also the
case that the overall callback rate in Hohhot was higher than elsewhere at 9.30%. Thus the
apparent lack of discrimination could also be the result of the tighter labor market which
makes it more difficult for firms to discriminate. Comparing Hohhot to Urumqi gives some
evidence that the results in Hohhot are not just the result of a tight labor market. In
Urumqi, the overall callback rate was extremely low at 3.16%. There, we observed that the
callback rate for those with Uighur names was actually higher than that of those with Han
names, but not statistically significantly so. (Given the small number of applications for
Urumqi, it is not surprising that the difference between Uighur and Han callback rates was
statistically insignificant.) The candidates with ethnic minority names in these two locations
seemed to do as well as those with Han names. Employers and human resource managers
may themselves be ethnic minorities11 or have much more experience with ethnic minor-
ities and be less inclined to hold negative, implicit and explicit sterotypical attitudes of eth-
nic minority candidates.
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In Tables 2, 3, 4 above, we have sequentially discussed some of the factors that influ-
ence the callback rates received by candidates who are distinguished from each other
only by whether their names sound as if they belong to one of China’s more prominent
ethnic minority groups (Mongolian, Uighur, or Tibetan) or to the Han majority. In this
section of the paper, we explore how these factors interact. We estimate a probit re-
gression with the dependent variable indicating whether or not a candidate received a
callback for an interview. The independent variables include controls for a candidate’s
ethnicity, occupation, and location12. We also created control variables to track resume
characteristics such as whether the candidate had one or two previous jobs in the years
since graduating from university and whether the candidate obtained her university
education in the same city as the job posting or in another province.
The results in Table 5 show that even after controlling for all other factors, there
is a statically significant difference in the callback rates for candidates with each type
of ethnic minority name relative to the base case of candidates with Han-sounding
names. Given the callback rates of 6.43% overall and 8.15% for Han candidates, the
size of these marginal effects are very large. The candidates with Mongolian namesTable 5 Marginal effects of the determinants of interview callbacks received by young
women with ethnically-differentiated names in response to applications submitted
through Chinese internet job boards
Probit Statistics:
Number of Observations 21,592
Wald chi2() 404.24
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood −5,000.56
Actual rate of callbacks 0.064
Average Marginal Effects on Prediction of Callback
Marginal Effects dy/dx Std.Err. z P>z
Indicator of Ethnicity of Name
Mongolian −0.022 0.004 −5.91 0.000
Uighur −0.035 0.004 −10.04 0.000
Tibetan −0.045 0.003 −13.77 0.000
base: Han
Indicator of Advertised Occupation
Accounting −0.021 0.005 −4.39 0.000
Admin. Assistant 0.017 0.006 312 0.002
(base: Sales Rep.)
Indicator of Job Location
Chengdu 0.009 0.006 1.51 0.131
Kunming 0.023 0.007 3.26 0.001
Urumqi −0.025 0.012 −2.08 0.037
Shenzhen −0.007 0.006 −1.09 0.277
Hohhot 0.030 0.020 1.51 0.130
(base: Nanjing)
Indicators for Education Received in/out of Province and Job Stabilty
Locally Educated 0.010 0.003 2.98 0.003
Only One Previous Job 0.008 0.003 2.54 0.011
Notes: Name ethnicity and occupation are fully interacted in underlying probit.
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the Uighur and Tibetan rates are 3.5 and 4.5 percentage points lower, respectively,
than that of the Han.
Table 6 reports the results of the Chi-squared tests, based on the probit regression under-
lying Table 5, which allow us to compare the callback rates of each ethnic group to one an-
other. It reveals that the callback rates for the minorities are not just significantly different
from those received by candidates with Han names. The callback rates of the candidates
with Mongolian names are significantly higher than those received by those with Uighur
and the Tibetan names. And, the callback rate received by those Uighur names are signifi-
cantly higher than that received by those with Tibetan names.
The marginal effects presented in Table 5 also reveal that firms have clear prefer-
ences on resume characteristics. All else equal, the callback rate for candidates with
just one previous job was 1 percentage point higher than for those with two previous
jobs. (Recall that all of our candidates are 24 years old and had graduated from uni-
versity approximately 2 to 3 years before applying for the posted positions.) Similarly,
firms seem to value local education. All else equal, those who attended university in
the same city as the job posting received callbacks rates almost 1 percentage point
higher than those educated at universities in other provinces. Although these results
are interesting in and of themselves, they also provide evidence that the reviewers are
carefully reading resumes and not making random calls. This evidence (that resume
screeners are carefully reading resumes) adds more weight to the findings of discrim-
ination on ethnic sounding names.
There are also significant differences by both occupation and location, suggesting
that the labor market conditions differ substantially across these dimensions. In the
summer of 2011, the callback rate for accounting positions was over 2 percentage
points lower than that of sales representative while that for administrative assistant/
specialists was almost 2 percentage points higher. The labor market conditions in
Kunming seemed to facilitate the chances of getting interview callbacks. The callback
rate in Urumqi was quite low; perhaps, given the paucity of job postings there, Inter-
net job boards were not yet in common use and/or when used, not fully trusted as a
good source of job candidates. Of course, the low callback rate may also simply reflect
local labor market conditions.
In a separate probit regression (not reported here) we also explore the effects of loca-
tion further by interacting controls for the cities in autonomous minority areas
(Urumqi and Hohhot) with controls for their own minorities (Uighurs in Urumqi and
Mongolian in Hohhot). Even with the relatively low number of job postings in these
areas, we obtain significant results. The interaction term of Hohhot and Mongolian
completely and exactly offsets the negative effect of Mongolian ethnicity relative to the
Han, that is, the Mongolians in Hohhot suffer no disadvantage due to their ethnicity in
getting interview callbacks. However, it is important to note that neither are theyTable 6 Chi-squared tests of differences in callback rates between minorities
Tests for Equality in the Marginal Effects by Ethnicity in Obtaining a Callback
Mongolian=Uighur Mongolian=Tibetan Uighur=Tibetan
chi2(1) 6.54 21.29 4.13
Prob>chi2 0.0105 0.0000 0.0421
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ferent. There is a positive and large coefficient on the interaction term of Urumqi and
Uighur, which suggests that Uighurs are advantaged in getting callbacks in their own
minority area. All else equal, in Urumqi, candidates with Uighur names are more likely
to receive callbacks than candidates with Han names.
Our findings thus far indicate that ethnic minority job candidates are the recipients
of discriminatory treatment. Their callback rates are significantly lower than those
received by equally qualified candidates with Han names. This, however, does not imply
that all firms discriminate. We turn now to an analysis of our firm data.
Results–analysis of firms making callbacks
Our job candidates received a total of 1,389 interview callbacks. 944 different firms
made these callbacks. Some of our firms contacted only candidates with Han names,
some contacted only candidates with minority names, and some contacted both. In this
section of the paper, we examine the characteristics of firms that appear to treat candi-
dates of differing ethnicity equally and those that seem to favor those of one ethnicity
over another. We have organized our results according to two sets of firm characteris-
tics: firm ownership (Tables 7 and 8) and firm size (Tables 9 and 10) and by the ethnici-
ties of the pair of candidates submitted to each firm (Tables 11 and 12). In each of
these sets of tables, the first table contains the results for all 944 firms making at least
one callback. The second tables repeat the analysis for firms located only in Urumqi
and Hohhot, the two autonomous minority areas.
The first row of Table 7 reveals that the share of firms making callbacks to both of
the candidates (47%) is effectively equal to the share calling only Han candidates
(46%). Only 7% of firms made callbacks to minorities only. The remaining rows of
the table indicate that firms of one type of ownership clearly stand out from the rest:
the firms under state ownership are much less likely than firms under other forms of
ownership to call only Han candidates and much more likely to call back both candi-
dates, that is, state-owned firms have the highest propensity to treat minority and
Han candidates equally.Table 7 Firm callback patterns by firm ownership and candidate ethnicity
Number and Frequency of Firms Making Callbacks to:
Firm Ownership Han Candidate Only Minority Candidate Only Both Candidates Total
All Firms No. 435 64 445 944
% 46.08 6.78 47.14 100
Private No. 315 50 315 680
% 46.32 7.35 46.32 100
Joint Venture No. 32 3 31 66
% 48.48 4.55 46.97 100
Foreign No. 56 2 56 114
% 49.12 1.75 49.12 100
State No. 14 3 27 44
% 31.82 6.82 61.36 100
Unknown No. 18 6 16 40
% 45 15 40 100
Table 8 Firm callback patterns in minority autonomous regions by firm ownership and
candidate ethnicity
Number and Frequency of Firms Making Callbacks to:
Firm Ownership Han Candidate Only Minority Candidate Only Both Candidates Total
Total No. 5 7 19 31
% 16.13 22.58 61.29 100
Private No. 2 5 9 16
% 12.5 31.25 56.25 100
Joint Venture No. 2 0 3 5
% 40 0 60 100
Foreign No. 1 1 3 5
% 20 20 60 100
State No. 0 0 1 1
% 0 0 100 100
Unknown No. 0 1 3 4
% 0 25 75 100
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back both candidates than is the case for the whole sample of firms (61% vs. 47% in
Table 7). We also observe a higher share of firms making callbacks to minority only
candidates (23% vs. 7%) and a lower share of firms making callbacks to Han only candi-
dates (16% vs. 46%). Firms in minority areas are most likely to callback both candidates,
but when they make only one call, it is more likely to be to a candidate with a minority
name than a candidate with a Han name (23% vs. 16%). Unfortunately, the sample of
firms making callbacks in minority areas is too small to make any definitive statements
on differentiation by ownership type
In the next pair of tables, we explore the hypothesis that firm size may be
related to firms’ decisions about whom to call back. Employers may choose to
hire candidates of one ethnicity over another because they prefer to have employ-
ees that are culturally similar to them. That is, firms may be making choices that
are based simply on employer tastes or preferences that are not related to firm
productivity (Bursell 2007). If so, it is possible that we would observe less dis-
crimination in large companies than small ones as it may be the case that socialTable 9 Firm callback patterns by firm size (number of employees) and candidate
ethnicity
Number and Frequency of Firms Making Callbacks to:
Firm Size Han Candidate Only Minority Candidate Only Both Candidates Total
Medium 50-500 No. 206 24 231 461
% 44.69 5.21 50.11 100
Small <50 No. 107 25 99 231
% 46.32 10.82 42.86 100
Large >500 No. 118 11 111 240
% 49.17 4.58 46.25 100
Unknown No. 4 4 4 12
% 33.33 33.33 33.33 100
Total No. 435 64 445 944
% 46.08 6.78 47.14 100
Table 10 Firm callback patterns in minority autonomous regions (Hohhot and Urumqi)
by firm size (number of employees) and candidate ethnicity
Number and Frequency of Firms Making Callbacks to:
Firm Size Han Candidate Only Minority Candidate Only Both Candidates Total
Medium 50-500 No. 2 2 7 11
% 18.18 18.18 63.64 100
Small <50 No. 0 1 1 2
% 0 50 50 100
Large >500 No. 3 4 9 16
% 18.75 25 56.25 100
Unknown No. 0 0 2 2
% 0 0 100 100
Total No. 5 7 19 31
% 16.13 22.13 61.29 100
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large companies than small ones.
In Table 9, a mixed picture emerges. While the share of small (those with 50 or fewer
employees) firms’ callbacks going to minority only candidates (10.8%) is significantly
higher than the shares of callbacks to minority only candidates at medium (5.2%) and
large firms (4.6%), the share of small firms’ callbacks to both candidates (42.9%) is sig-
nificantly lower than the share of callbacks to both candidates at medium-sized firms
(50.1%). Although small companies seem slightly less likely than large companies to
discriminate against ethnic minority candidates in the sense of having higher callback
shares for Han only candidates (47% vs. 49%) and slightly more likely to callback Han
only candidates than medium-sized companies (47% vs. 45%), these differences are not
statistically significant.
When we separate out the callbacks made by firms in minority autonomous regions,
we see that the share of callbacks to both candidates by firms of all sizes is 50% or
greater. (See Table 10.) We also observe that shares of callback by firms in minority areas
to minority only candidates is as least as high as the share of callbacks going to Han only
candidates. Firms in minority areas appear to treat minority candidates equitably.
In Table 11, we see that the ethnic composition of candidate pairs matters.
Mongolian-Han candidate pairs have a lower share of Han only callbacks than doTable 11 Firm callback patterns by ethnic composition of candidate pairs
Number and Frequency of Firms Making Callbacks to:
Firm Size Han Candidate Only Minority Candidate Only Both Candidates Total
Mongolian-Han Pair No. 134 38 178 350
% 38.29 10.86 50.86 100
Uighur-Han Pair No. 144 18 140 302
% 47.68 5.96 46.36 100
Tibetan-Han Pair No. 157 8 127 292
% 53.77 2.74 43.49 100
Total No. 435 64 445 944
% 46.08 6.78 47.14 100
Notes: The callback rate of firms to minority candidates only is significantly higher for Mongolian-Han pairs than others.
The call backrate of firms to Han candidates only is significantly lower for Mongolian-Han pairs than others.
Table 12 Firm callback patterns in minority autonomous regions (Hohhot and Urumqi)
by ethnic composition of candidate pairs
Number and Frequency of Firms Making Callbacks to:
Firm Size Han Candidate Only Minority Candidate Only Both Candidates Total
Mongolian-Han Pair No. 3 2 16. 21
% 14.29 9.52 76.19 100
Uighur-Han Pair No. 2 5 3 10
% 20 50 30 100
Total No. 5 7 19 31
% 16.13 22.58 61.29 100
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shares of callbacks for minority only and both called than do Uighur-Han or Tibetan-
Han pairs of applicants. In Table 12, we see that firms in Hohhot, which received only
Mongolian-Han pairs, were highly likely to contact both their Han and Mongolian can-
didates for interviews. Firms in Urumqi, which received only Uighur-Han pairs, seemed
quite inclined to contact only Uighur candidates for interviews. Of course, the number
of firms in minority areas making callbacks is very small. Therefore, the results for the
autonomous regions should be viewed as suggestive only.
Multinomial probit –analysis of firms that make callbacks
In the above analysis, we’ve examined tables of firm callback patterns by firm own-
ership, firm size, and the ethnic composition of candidate pairs. In each case there
are some significant factors that help to explain differences in firm behavior with re-
spect to choosing which candidates to call back for interviews. We now combine
these factors in a multinomial probit regression. The dependent variable is a categor-
ical variable that indicates whether firms call back only candidates with Han names,
only candidates with minority names, or both types of candidates. The independent
variables include indicators for the ethnic composition of the candidate pair submit-
ted to each firm, the occupation of the advertised position, the location of the job
posting, firm ownership type, and firm size. In addition, we have included a set of
indicators that take on the value one when only the Han applicant had local educa-
tion, when only the Han applicant had one previous job, when only the minority ap-
plicant had local education, and when only the minority applicant had one previous
job13. (These characteristics were revealed as preferred in the individual level analysis
of the previous section.)
In the multinomial probit, we use equal treatment as the base outcome, that is, that
firms callback both candidates for interviews. Table 13 consists of three panels that re-
veal the marginal effects of our control variables on the predicted outcomes: a) that
firms make callbacks only to Han candidates; b) that firms make callbacks only to mi-
nority candidates; or c) that firms make callbacks to both candidates14.
What factors help to explain whether a firm will call back only the Han candidate
from the pair of applications it received? Panel A of Table 13 reveals that all else equal,
firms that receive Han-Tibetan pairs are 8.4 percentage points more likely to call only
the Han candidate than firms that receive applications from Han-Mongolian pairs. In
addition, it appears that human resource managers are paying attention to resume char-
acteristics: all else equal, if the pair of resumes submitted to a firm was such that the
Table 13 Marginal effects of the determinants of the callback patterns of firms in
response to paired Han and minority applicants
Multinomial Probit Statistics:













Control Variables dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z
Indicator of Ethnic Composition of Paired Applicants
Han-Tibetan pair of applicants 0.084 2.38 −0.100 −4.83 0.016 0.044
Han-Uiguhr pair of applicants 0.045 1.27 −0.089 −4.62 0.044 1.21
Indicators of Potentially Preferable Resume Characteristics within an Applicant Pair
Only Han applicant had single previous job −0.013 −0.36 0.003 0.17 0.010 0.26
Only Han applicant had local education 0.118 3.31 −0.010 −0.52 −0.108 −2.93
Only minority applicant had single previous job −0.089 −2.43 0.027 1.45 0.062 1.67
Only minority applicant had local education −0.109 −2.99 0.002 0.10 0.107 2.90
Base cases:same job histories/ education location
Indicator of Advertised Occupation
Firm advertising accounting position −0.020 −0.49 −0.092 −3.68 0.111 2.72
Firm advertising administrative assistant position −0.169 −5.45 −0.012 −0.75 0.181 5.69
Base case: Firm advertising sales position
Indicator of Location of Job Posting
Chengdu 0.212 5.65 −0.153 −5.48 −0.059 −1.47
Kunming 0.014 0.31 0.005 0.26 −0.019 −0.43
Urumqi −0.161 −0.92 0.211 3.86 −0.049 −0.28
Shenzhen 0.219 5.20 −0.063 −2.79 −0.157 −3.56
Hohhot −0.218 −1.72 −0.072 −1.45 0.290 2.39
Base case: Nanjing
Indicator of Firm Ownership Type
Firm under joint ownership 0.008 0.13 −0.058 −1.59 0.050 0.78
Firm under foreign ownership 0.011 0.21 −0.115 −2.77 0.104 2.00
Firm state-owned −0.138 −1.80 −0.026 −0.64 0.164 2.15
Type of firm ownership unknown −0.061 −0.71 0.036 0.92 0.025 0.28
Base case: firm privately owned
Indicator of Firm Size
Small firm < 50 employees 0.013 0.35 −0.001 −0.06 −0.012 −0.31
Large firm > 500 employees 0.045 1.17 −0.007 −0.30 −0.038 −0.97
Firm size unknown 0.143 0.81 0.134 2.36 −0.277 −1.55
Base case: medium sized firm
Notes:
The underlying multinomial probit is estimated for firms making at least one callback.
The estimation is based on the outcome that firms call back both of the paired applicants.
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more likely to callback only the Han. Similarly if the minority candidate had more desir-
able resume characteristics in terms of local education or job stability (only one previous
job) when the Han had out of province education and/or two previous jobs, then the
probability of the firm calling only the Han candidate was significantly lowered.
Location also matters. Firms posting jobs in Chengdu and Shenzhen are 21.2 and
21.9 percentage points more likely to choose only Han candidates for interviews than
firms in Nanjing. The result is quite surprising given that Nanjing is a very traditional
Chinese city with a very long history while Shenzhen is a recently developed city full of
migrants. We might have expected that difference was more of a norm in Shenzhen. In
contrast, firms in Hohhot are 21.8 percentage points less likely than firms in Nanjing
to choose only Han candidates for interviews.
If firms are accommodating customer preferences for dealing with Han employees, we
expect that firms might have higher rates of callbacks for Han only candidates in the
occupations that have more direct customer interactions. Not surprisingly, firms adver-
tising administrative assistants positions are 16.9 percentage points less likely to contact
only Han candidates than firms advertising sales representative openings. The market
for administrative assistant/specialists was the tightest of our three occupationally-
differentiated markets. Somewhat more surprising is the lack of significant difference in
this respect between firms advertising accounting and sales representative openings.
Accountants have much less direct customer contact that sales representatives.
Here, as in the bivariate analysis of Table 7, state-owned firms seem to distinguish
themselves from all other forms of ownership. They are 13.8 percentage points less
likely than privately-owned firms to call only candidates with Han names.
What factors help to explain whether a firm will call back only the minority candi-
date? Table 13 Panel B reveals that firms clearly prefer candidates with Mongolian
names to those with Uighur or Tibetan names. If a firm is going to call back only a mi-
nority candidate, it is 10 and 8 percentage points more likely to do so when the pair
contains a woman with a Mongolian name than a woman with a Uighur or Tibetan
name. Firms that advertised accounting positions are 9.2 percentage points less likely
to callback minority only candidates than those advertising openings for sales represen-
tatives. Firms in Chengdu and Shenzhen appear to behave significantly differently from
firms in Nanjing; they are less likely to call minority only candidates. Firms in Urumqi
are more likely to call only minority candidates.
State-owned firms are not significantly more likely to callback minority only candi-
dates than privately-owned firms, that is, they do not appear to advantage minority
candidates. Foreign-owned firms, however, are significantly less likely to callback only
minority candidates.
Panel C of Table 13 reveals the marginal effects of our control variables on the out-
come of equal treatment, that is, that firms call back both candidates. The marginal
effects in this panel are the sums of the effects of the same variable in Panels A and
Panel B. However, it seems convenient for purposes of discussion to present them in
their own panel. Firms that call back both minority and Han candidates don’t seem to
care about the particular ethnic composition of the pair. There is an interesting oppos-
ition in the sign of the marginal effects on preferable resume characteristics. On the
one hand, firms that received a pair of resumes in which the Han candidate had local
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back both candidates. (Such firms were instead more likely to call only the Han candi-
date.) On the other hand, when a firm received a pair of applications in which the mi-
nority candidate had local education when the Han did not, it was more likely to call
back both candidates. Thus, firms responded differently to deliberately controlled re-
sume characteristics depending on whether the Han or the minority candidate had the
more desirable characteristic. A better resume characteristic on a Han resume appeared
to give the Han candidate a better chance of getting the firm’s only callback. A better
characteristic on a minority resume did not better the minority candidate’s chances of
getting a firm’s only callback, but did improve the chances that the firm would contact
both minority and Han candidates for interviews. This is a very subtle form of discrim-
ination but leads to different callback rates experienced by the individuals. State-owned
and foreign-owned firms were more likely than privately-owned firms, all else held con-
stant, to offer interviews to both minority and Han candidates.
Conclusions
This study employs a resume audit design to explore how Chinese firms respond to job
applications that vary only in terms of the ethnicity of the candidates’ names. Our study fo-
cuses on a very dynamic and rapidly increasing segment of the China’s labor markets—the
Internet job boards. Labor law in China distinctly states the employees and job seekers
must not be discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity. We find however, clear
evidence of discrimination. Female job seekers with Mongolian names would need to sub-
mit 36% more applications than equally qualified women with Han names to get the same
number of callbacks. The situation is even worse for women with Uighur and Tibetan
names who must submit 83 and 121% more applications, respectively, to get as many call-
backs as women with Han names.
Minority candidates applying for jobs posted in one of the two autonomous minority
regions included in this study do not experience this type of discrimination. There is
no apparent difference in the treatment of Mongolian and Han applicants in Hohhot.
And, Uighur applicants in Urumqi experience a positive advantage over Han candidates
in their job searches.
In our analysis at the firm level, we find that not all firms discriminate. In our sample
of firms that make callbacks in response to at least one of the two applications they re-
ceive, the majority (54%) either call back both applicants, that is, they treat Han and
minority applicants alike (47%) or call back only their minority applicant (7%). How-
ever, a disturbingly large percentage (46%) of firms give preference to applicants with
Han names, that is, they only call back Han applicants.
Some characteristics of firms do matter, state-owned firms are significantly less likely
than firms under other forms of ownership to give preference to candidates with Han
names in setting up interviews. Firms in different locations tend to behave differently.
Those in Chengdu and Shenzhen are much more likely to choose only Han candidates
than firms in Nanjing, while firms in Hohhot are much less likely than those in Nanjing
to give preference to Han candidates. Firm size does not seem to play a role in deter-
mining the likelihood that a firm might discriminate against minorities.
Our analysis at both the individual and the firm levels clearly indicates that human
resource managers screening resumes are paying attention to resume characteristics.
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prefer candidates who have not previously changed jobs. They also prefer to hire locally
educated candidates. That screeners are paying attention to resume characteristics sug-
gests a rather simple solution to mitigate some of the discrimination against minority
candidates participating in the Internet job board labor market. If job board companies
institute a system wherein resumes are submitted to firms with identifying numbers ra-
ther than names, minority candidates would be much more likely to get the proverbial
foot in the door at this critical stage of the hiring process—getting an interview. Unfor-
tunately, if discrimination takes place based on the relatively abstract level of resume
name differentiation, it is also likely to take place during in-person interviews15.
Endnotes
1This project was reviewed and approved by the co-chairs of the Institutional Review
Board of Bates College.
2See for examples Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Booth, Leigh, and Varganova
(2011), Bursell (2007), Kaas and Manger (2011), Oreopoulos and Dechief (2011), Riach
and Rich (2002), and Siddique (2008).
3For example, in 2002, the minority population of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Region constituted only 20.9 percent of its total population. Comparable figures for
Guangxi Zhuang and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions are 38.4 percent and 35.4
percent, respectively. Tibet and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regions are notable
exceptions, with the minority populations constituting 96.7 and 60.1 3.
4See for example China’s Yearbook of Ethnic Works (SEAC 2003), China’s Ethnic Stat-
istical Yearbook (SEAC and NBS 2000), and the Statistical Yearbooks of China (NBS
2005).
5Barabantseva (2009) notes that although the rhetoric surrounding the Western De-
velopment Plan suggests that it was designed specifically for ethnic minorities and mi-
nority areas, one of its core elements is the opening of the areas natural resources for
the benefit of the rest of the country. core elements is the opening of the areas natural
resources for the benefit of the rest of the country.
6The evidence on the existence and extent of underlying discrimination is mixed.
Hasmath (2012b) presents evidence that Uighurs are underrepresented in high-paying,
high-status jobs in Xinjiang’s urban areas. Howell and Fan (2011) show that among re-
cent self-initiated migrants to Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, the Uighurs are faring better
than the Han in terms of occupational status and remuneration.
7See for example, Riach and Rich (2002), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), and
Pager (2007).
8Although in China, an individual’s official ethnicity is recorded on his/her identity
card, we did not explicitly state our candidate’s official ethnicity on resumes since
1) there were no fill-in blanks or check boxes for this purpose on the up-loadable forms
and 2) we did not find any examples of candidates stating their ethnicity in the sample
of real resumes we examined.
9For job postings in the city of Shenzhen, we counted education obtained in the
nearby city of Guangzhou as local.
10Hasmath (2011) argues that a fairly large share of urban jobs in China are obtained
through personal network searches and that there is a higher propensity for ethnic
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http://www.izajom.com/content/1/1/12minority disadvantages when jobs are obtained through such channels. If so, the results
presented here may rather represent a lower bound for the degree of discrimination
faced by job candidates of these ethnic groups.
11We were unable to tell from the job postings whether the firms to which we sub-
mitted applications were minority owned. We were also unable to determine anything
about the ethnic status of the human resource professionals who screened the resumes.
l2In the underlying probits, we fully interact ethnicity and occupation. It would be de-
sirable to also fully interact these variables with location. However the application
process that limited the ethnicity of applicants submitted in response to job ads for
Hohhot and Urumqi in combination with the small number of job postings in these
two cities left several cells either empty or with too few responses to be able to calcu-
late marginal effects. We estimated a model with a full set of interactions of the ethni-
city, occupation, and location variables for the subset of the data that excluded the 810
observations from Hohhot and Urumqi. We found the marginal effects to be virtually
identical to those presented in Table 5.
13The base case was that the Han and minority candidates had equally desirable or
equally undesirable characteristics. For example, both were educated locally or both were
educated out of province or both had just one previous job or both had two previous jobs.
14The marginal effect of each control variable in Panel-a and Panel-b sum up to the
marginal effect of the same variable in Panel-c.
15Hasmath (2012a) argues that ethnic minority candidates have higher odds of being
penalized during interviews due to the perception that they may not fit into the par-
ticular workplace culture. Our study does not capture discrimination in the interview
phase of the job search process.
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